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INTRODUCTION

Despite advances in DNA technology and the ability, for the first
time, to prove almost conclusively the guilt or innocence of a defendant, the Supreme Court recently held that access to DNA testing is
constitutionally irrelevant.' In District Attorney's Office v. Osborne,
the Supreme Court held that there is no independent Constitutional
right to post-conviction DNA testing under the Fourteenth Amendment.2 Instead, the Court held that it must be left up to the States to
enact post-conviction relief statutes.' This Note posits that the Court
must acknowledge the inevitable changes that modern DNA testing
presents to the court system and lead the way in creating fitting policy
that ensures all prisoners are able to access evidence to prove their
innocence. It will argue that the protections afforded to individuals
under the Constitution of the United States must be analyzed in light
of modern society and its capabilities.' Nothing is more fundamental
to the Constitution than the protection of individual liberty so our
system of jurisprudence must be flexible enough to incorporate scientific advances that will allow the Court to better safeguard this important right.' Lastly, it will argue that for the following reasons, the
most likely means of accomplishing the recognition of this right is
through the substantive due process doctrine.
1. District Attorney's Office v. Osborne, 129 S.Ct. 2308, 2323 (2009).
2. Id. at 2322.
3. Id. at 2323.
4. Elizabeth A. Laughton, Note, McKithen v. Brown: Due Process and PostConviction DNA Testing, 2008 Duke L. & Tech. Rev. 0007.
5. Harvey v. Horan (Harvey II), 285 F.3d 298, 304-05 (4th Cir.) (2002) (Luttig, J.,
respecting the denial of rehearing en banc).
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HISTORICAL BASES OF THE COURT'S HOLDING IN OSBORNE

Historically, courts have distrusted exculpatory evidence discovered
following a conviction. 6 Notions of finality and comity have dominated the system, in large part based on tradition.7 Faith in the court
system requires a dogmatic belief that the just result has been
reached.' Moreover, finality is in the states' best interest given the
expense and resources required by endless appeals.' Finally, there is a
general distrust of witnesses who come forward years after the trial.o
Their memories are likely to have faded and their motives become
suspect." As a result, the probative value of this evidence is deemed
minimal. Over the years, the Supreme Court has adhered to these
principles despite calls for change. In Herrera v. Collins, the Court
held that there is no constitutional claim for actual innocence post-

conviction. 1 2
1II.

DEVELOPMENTS IN

DNA

TESTING

More so than ever before, DNA testing today has the capability to
provide concrete evidence of factual innocence." DNA evidence was
first introduced in criminal proceedings in the mid-80's and since then
there have been rapid advances in its technology, demonstrating increasing reliability.14 These advances have culminated in Short Tandem Repeat (STR) DNA, used predominantly in forensic
identification science today." STR DNA exponentially increases the
reliability of forensic identification over earlier techniques.1 6 The
method uses an enzyme to make many copies of a small section of an
individual's DNA.17 This section is then cut into pieces by another
enzyme, and separated.' 8 The fragments are then examined under a
silver stain where repeat units, or patterns of dark and light stripes
emerge.' 9 Because different unrelated people have different numbers
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
(2006).
13.
banc).
14.

Brandon Garrett, Claiming Innocence, 92 MINN. L. REV. 1629, 1630 (2008).
Id.; See Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390, 427-28 (1993) (Scalia, J., concurring).
See Herrera, 506 U.S. at 428 (Scalia, J., concurring).
See id. at 417.
Garrett, supra note 6, at 1630.
Id.
Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390, 417 (1993); House v. Bell, 547 U.S. 518
Harvey II, 285 F.3d at 305 (Luttig, J., respecting the denial of rehearing en
Osborne, 129 S.Ct. at 2316.

15. Id.

16. Harvey II, 285 F.3d at 305 (Luttig, J., respecting the denial of rehearing en
banc).
17. Donald E. Riley, Ph.D., DNA Testing: An Introduction For Non-Scientists: An
Illustrated Explanation, SCIENTIFIC TESTIMONY: AN ONLINE J. (2005), http://www.sci
entific.org/tutorials/articles/riley/riley.html
18. Id.
19. Id.
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of repeat units, these regions of DNA can be used to discriminate between unrelated individuals.2 0 Current techniques can often yield reliable results from a single cell.2 1 Moreover, STR testing is capable of
producing reliable results even when samples are severely disintegrated.2 2 STR testing is unique because of its unparalleled statistical power of discrimination.2 3 Under the analysis, the probability that
two random individuals will have the same DNA is only one in three
trillion.2 4 For purposes of understanding the magnitude of these
figures of probability, it is estimated that there are only six billion persons on the planet.2 5 There is widespread agreement within the scientific community that this technology has the capability to distinguish
between any two individuals, save identical twins, on the planet.2 6
This means that for the first time, in certain cases scientific technology
has the power to determine whether a defendant is guilty or innocent
of a crime for which he has been convicted to a virtual certainty.27
IV.

LEGISLATIVE REACTIONS TO ADVANCES IN
DNA TECHNOLOGY

The advances in DNA testing and its implications have been recognized by both federal and state legislatures.
A.

Federal Legislature's Reaction

The Innocence Protection Act of 2004 was the first piece of federal
legislation to address the changes that the evolution of DNA testing
posed to criminal proceedings in the post-conviction context.2 8 It was
housed in the Justice for All Act of 2004, which enhanced protections
for victims of federal crime, increased federal resources available to
state and local governments to combat crimes with DNA technology,
and provided safeguards to prevent wrongful convictions and executions. 2 9 The Innocence Protection Act provides access to post-conviction DNA testing in federal cases, helps states improve the quality of
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. DNA Notes: All About DNA, STR Analysis, http://dnanotes.blogspot.com/
2010/11/str-analysis.html (last visited Feb. 21, 2011).
25. World Population Clock, http://math.berkeley.edu/-galen/popclk.html (last
visited Feb. 20, 2011)
26. Harvey II, 285 F.3d at 305 (Luttig, J., respecting the denial of the rehearing en
banc).
27. Id.
28. See Press Release, Sen. Patrick Leahy, Oversight of the Justice For All Act:
Has the Justice Department Effectively Administered the Bloodsworth and Coverdell
DNA Grant Programs (Jan. 23, 2008), http://leahy.senate.gov/press/press-releases/
release/?id=787763e4-73ce-4cb7-8a85-bda69fe39760.
29. Pub. L. No. 108-405, 118 Stat. 2260 (2004) (codified in scattered sections of 18,
28, and 42 U.S.C.).
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legal representation in capital cases, and increases compensation in
federal cases of wrongful conviction.3 0 It also authorized $25 million
over five years to defray the costs of post-conviction DNA testing."
B.

State Legislatures' Reactions

The majority of state legislatures have taken similar measures.
Forty-seven states have enacted post-conviction DNA testing access
statutes; 3 2 however, statutory innocence claims retain substantial limitations because many of these statutes implement procedural hurdles
over which the person seeking relief must jump in order to obtain
access to testing. Many of these laws appear to have been arbitrarily
constructed; they illustrate very little consistency from state to state.
Therefore, although almost all states and the federal government have
legislation in place aimed at providing post-conviction relief, they still
do not safeguard a prisoner's right to access DNA testing.
Many states impose outcome-based statutory limitations to DNA
testing access. 3 4 In these states, the statute imposes a test whereby the
court must determine the likely probative impact of the DNA evidence before access is granted. The standard which must be met differs among states. The vast majority of states require a threshold
showing of "materiality" before testing is granted.3 5 Materiality requires the petitioner to show that "a reasonable probability exists that
the petitioner would not have been convicted if exculpatory results
had been obtained through DNA testing." 36 This means that even if
the court finds that evidence obtained through DNA testing could be
probative of innocence, access will not be granted unless it meets the
reasonable probability standard." Kansas, Nebraska, and Wyoming
set a low threshold by allowing access to DNA on a showing that there
is a likelihood that the DNA will be probative of innocence.3 8 Nonetheless, two states impose an even lower standard. Colorado and
Texas require that it be "more probable than not" that the requested
DNA evidence would prove innocence.39 New Hampshire and Virginia require "clear and substantial evidence of" or "a substantial
showing" that the DNA evidence would prove innocence before access will be granted.40 Virginia requires a petitioner to show "clear
and convincing evidence that the test results would prove materially
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.

Id.
Id.
Garrett, supra note 7, at 1673.
Id. at 1675.
Id. at 1676.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Garrett, supra note 7, at 1676.
Id.
Id.
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relevant, may prove innocence, and would not be cumulative or contradictory."4 1 In doing so, the State ensures that it is virtually impossible for a convict to be exonerated through DNA evidence since
without access to the evidence he is unable to prove those things necessary to allow him access.4 2 These structures expose the states' hesitancy to provide DNA testing to prove actual innocence. Moreover,
state courts have consistently interpreted these threshold showings
strictly.4 3
Twenty-five states predicate access to DNA testing on conviction
for certain crimes.4 4 Kentucky and Nevada limit testing applicants on
death row for capital crimes.45 Similarly, twenty-one states require
that the petitioner be incarcerated or in custody in order to obtain
testing. Only seventeen states provide for testing when the petitioner
seeks only a sentence reduction rather than relief from conviction.46
State statutes further incorporate a broad range of restrictions. Sixteen states, including Pennsylvania, require that an applicant seeking
access to DNA testing must assert their actual innocence and present
a prima facie case that the identity of the perpetrator of the crime was
at issue in the proceedings that resulted in the applicant's conviction
and sentencing.47 These restrictions foreclose relief in cases where the
petitioner pled guilty at trial. 48 In fact, they require that the defendant plead innocent at trial, which might have been strategically difficult to do without the support of DNA evidence.4 9 Consequently,
seven states permit testing if identity "should have" been raised at
trial, even if it was not.50 Twelve states require that the testing was
technologically impossible at the time of trial; however, few states recognize the right to testing based solely on the constantly advancing
technology.
Several states have enacted time restrictions. 52 Five states require
that the motions be brought within one to three years following conviction, although all of them but Delaware and Idaho include goodcause exceptions to this rule. 53 Lastly, only twenty-four states provide
counsel to petitioners through this process. Four states have held that
attorney error, including the failure to request DNA testing at trial or
41.
42.
43.
preted
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.

Id. at 1676-77.
Id. at 1677.
See id. for an in-depth discussion on how various circuit courts have interthese threshold showing requirements.
Garrett, supra note 7, at 1680.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1680-81.
Id. at 1680.
Id. at 1681.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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to exercise due diligence does not warrant post-conviction DNA
testing.
Still three states do not have any DNA access statutes incorporated
into their state law: Alaska, Massachusetts, and Oklahoma. Instead,
Alaska has a general post-conviction relief statute under which a person who has been "convicted of, or sentenced for, a crime may institute a proceeding for post-conviction relief if the person claims ...
that there exists evidence of material facts, not previously presented
and heard by the court, that requires vacation of the conviction or
sentence in the interest of justice."5 5 The problem is that newly discovered evidence cannot be presented unless access is first provided. The
state of Alaska claims that discovery procedures provide this mechanism, however as of yet, it concedes that no litigant has obtained evidence for such testing under the statute.56
In light of the inconsistencies in state statutes and the limitations
placed on access to post-conviction relief across the board, the only
way to guarantee a prisoner's right to access DNA testing which is
likely to determine the guilt or innocence of a convict following conviction is to recognize it as a constitutional right. Until recently it was
still unclear whether prisoners had this right in addition to their statutory rights. However, on March 2, 2009, the Supreme Court finally
addressed the issue in Osborne, holding that prisoners have no constitutional right to post-conviction DNA testing that might prove their
innocence.
V.

THE CASE: DISTRICT ATTORNEY'S OFFICE V. OSBORNE

The issue arose out of an Alaska case, which resulted in a long
string of litigation in state and federal courts. Sixteen years ago, two
men were driving through Anchorage, Alaska when they solicited sex
from a female prostitute, identified as "K.G."5 After negotiating a
price, she agreed to perform fellatio on both men and got in their car.
When she demanded payment up front, the two men pulled out a gun
and forcibly raped her, using a condom she had brought. The men
then ordered her out of the car and told her to lay face down in the
snow. When she refused, the men choked her and beat her with a gun.
She made a final attempt to escape and one of the men beat her with
an axe handle and then shot her in the head. They tried to cover her
body and then left her on the side of the road. Amazingly, the bullet
only grazed K.G.'s head and she survived. When she was sure the two
54.
55.
56.
2006).
57.
58.

Id. at 1682.
Alaska Stat. § 12.72 (2008).
Patterson v. State, No. A-8814, 2006 WL 573797, *4 (Alaska App., Mar. 8,
Osborne, 129 S.Ct. at 2308.
Id. at 2312-13.
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men had left, she got up and flagged down a passing car which took
her to the hospital to receive medical care and speak with the police.5 9
The police found the axe handle, a spent shell casing, some of
K.G.'s clothing stained with blood, and the blue condom. Six days
later, Dexter Jackson was pulled over for flashing his headlights at
another vehicle. In his car, they discovered a gun which matched the
spent shell casing recovered at the scene. He also matched the
description given by K.G.6 0 Jackson admitted that he had been the
driver during the rape and assault, and told the police that William
Osborne had been his passenger.6' Osborne was implicated by additional evidence as well. K.G. picked out his photograph and she identified him at the trial as her attacker. Other witnesses testified that
Osborne was with Jackson on the evening in question, and an axe handle similar to the one at the scene of the crime was found in Osborne's
room. 62
The State also performed DNA testing on Osborne. The State performed DQ Alpha testing on the blue condom. 63 "DQ Alpha testing is
a relatively inexact form of DNA testing that can clear some wrongly
accused individuals, but generally cannot narrow the perpetrator
down to less than 5% of the population."6 4 The semen found on the
condom had a genotype that matched a blood sample taken from Osborne. 65 Osborne is African-American and approximately 16% of African-Americans have the same genotype.6 6 The genotype did not
match Jackson's blood sample. 67 This means that the DQ Alpha testing ruled out Jackson, as well as 80% of other African-American
individuals.6 8
Osborne and Jackson were convicted by an Alaska jury for kidnapping, assault and sexual assault.6 9 Given the brutality of the crime,
Osborne was sentenced to twenty-six years in prison, with five years
suspended. 0 Osborne then sought post-conviction relief in Alaska
state court on three separate claims. First, he argued that his attorney
was constitutionally ineffective because she failed to comply with his
request for a more precise form of DNA testing during trial. 7 ' Osborne's attorney testified that after investigation, she had determined
that a more advanced DNA test would harm her client rather than
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.

Id. at 2313
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 2314.
Id. at 2314.
Id.
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help him. Her defense was mistaken identity and she feared that the
"DNA test would have served to prove that Osborne committed the
alleged crimes." 7 2 The Alaska court concluded that her decision had
been strategic and rejected his claims. 73
Second, he sought relief based on Alaska's post-conviction statute,
§ 12.72;74 however, § 12.72 does not apply to DNA testing that was
available at trial. Finally, Osborne argued that he had a claim under
both the Federal and State Constitutions.7 ' The state court found no
basis for recognizing a federal constitutional right to DNA testing. He
was precluded from bringing a state constitutional claim because, according to the court, the testing was not likely to be conclusive of his
guilt since there was additional evidence negating innocence.76 The
court relied heavily on the fact that Osborne had confessed some of
his crimes in a 2004 application for parole.
At the same.time, Osborne was also suing in federal court under 42
U.S.C. § 1983.77 He claimed that the Due Process Clause gave him a
constitutional right to access STR DNA testing.78 The United States
District Court for the District of Alaska dismissed the claim but the
Court of Appeals held that he had a due process right to post-conviction DNA access. The Supreme Court granted certiorari to decide
whether Osborne had a viable constitutional right to post-conviction
79
DNA testing.
VI.

FEDERAL VEHICLES AVAILABLE TO MAKE A
CONSTITUTIONAL CLAIM

Before examining the constitutional claims posed by Osborne, it is
necessary to understand the federal vehicles available to prisoners
seeking to remedy an alleged violation of their constitutional rights.
A.

Habeas Relief v. § 1983 Civil Rights Claim

Prisoners have two potential avenues available to them when appealing for federal relief from an alleged constitutional violation.so
They can file a civil suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 or apply for a writ of
habeas corpus under 28 USC § 2254." Both statutes create remedies
for violations of constitutional rights, but they differ in scope. 8 2 Section 1983 establishes a civil action for deprivation of constitutional
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 2315.
Id.
Id. at 2316.

80. Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 480 (1994).
81. Id.
82. Id.
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rights.83 It creates a federal remedy to address situations where "the
claims of citizens to the enjoyment of rights, privileges, and immunities guaranteed by the fourteenth amendment might be denied by the
state agencies."8 4 The federal remedy is auxiliary to the state remedy.8 5 This means that the petitioner does not need to exhaust state
remedies before it can be invoked.
The federal habeas statute authorizes state prisoners held in violation of federal law to apply for a writ of habeas corpus in federal
court.8 6 The purpose of the writ was to give a person in custody an
avenue to challenge the legality of that custody, and to obtain release
from illegal custody. 7 The writ requires a litigant to pursue and exhaust all state remedies." Federal habeas courts can hear state defaulted claims only in rare circumstances. Therefore, the greatest
practical distinction between the two remedies is procedural.
Whereas, a civil rights claim can be brought directly to federal court,
generally a habeas claim must first be exhausted in state courts.
1. The Blurring of the Distinction Between Habeas Relief and a
§ 1983 Claim
Over time, an increase in state post-conviction remedies coupled
with the writ's state exhaustion requirements meant a delay in federal
habeas relief." Thus, prisoners began to view § 1983 as an attractive
alternative to habeas relief because it bypassed the exhaustion requirements and provided immediate relief.9 0 Increasingly, the demarcation between the two statutes became blurred as prisoners sought to
use them interchangeably. 9' In Preiser v. Rodriguez, the Supreme
Court addressed the issue. It held that "when a state prisoner is challenging the very fact or duration of his physical imprisonment, and the
relief he seeks is a determination that he is entitled to immediate release or a speedier release from that imprisonment," habeas is the exclusive remedy, subject to its procedural exhaustion requirements. 92
In Heck v. Humphrey, the Court further decreased the scope of § 1983
by specifying that a prisoner cannot use § 1983 in any suit where success would "necessarily imply" the unlawfulness of a conviction or
sentence.9 3
83. 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
84. Benjamin Vetter, Habeas, Section 1983, and Post-Conviction Access to DNA
Evidence, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 587, 593 (2004).
85. Id.; Heck, 512 U.S. at 480.
86. Vetter, supra note 84, at 590.
87. Id. at 594.

88. Id.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.

Id. at 595.
Id.
Id.
Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 500 (1973).
Heck, 512 U.S. at 487.
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The Proper Vehicle Under Which to Bring a Federal Claim to
Access DNA Testing

These holdings led Circuit Courts to reach different conclusions regarding a prisoner's ability to use § 1983 as a vehicle for seeking access to DNA evidence. However, in 2004, the Supreme Court ruled
on a § 1983 claim which raised many of the same substantive issues as
Osborne. In Wilkinson v. Dotson, the court held that prisoners could
challenge the constitutionality of state parole procedures under
§ 1983.94 Habeas is the exclusive remedy only where the action seeks
invalidation of the judgment.95 The fact that the action, if successful,
may cause the State to seek a new judgment is not relevant.9 6 This
holding seems to suggest that a prisoner may bring a § 1983 claim
even if success in the action might later be used as a basis for release,
so long as it does not necessarily result in release.
In Osborne, the majority assumes without deciding that Heck does
not bar Osborne's § 1983 claim. 97 In doing so, the court failed to recognize the precedential nature of Wilkinson, and thus missed an opportunity to decisively rule on an increasingly relevant issue. Like the
petitioners in Wilkinson, Osborne "hoped"9 ' his suit would "help
bring about earlier release"; however the § 1983 suit could not accomplish that without further proceedings.9 9 Whether DNA is exculpatory cannot be determined until after the testing and the basis for the
claim is to get the opportunity to perform the testing. The extra step
that is required before the evidence can be used to challenge the validity of the conviction forms the basis of the distinction between a
§ 1983 claim and a habeas claim."oo Thus, under court precedent, a
§ 1983 claim is the correct vehicle under which to bring a claim for
post-conviction access to DNA testing.1 0 '
VII.

POTENTIAL DUE PROCESS GROUNDS FOR RECOGNITION OF A
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO ACCESS DNA TESTING
POST-CONVICTION

Both a § 1983 claim and a habeas claim must be brought to assert
an underlying constitutional right. This means that in order to succeed in a § 1983 claim, the court must recognize a constitutional right
to access DNA testing. Leading up to Osborne, scholars promulgated
94. Wilkinson v. Dotson, 544 U.S. 74, 76 (2005).
95. Id. at 81.
96. Id.
97. Osborne, 129 S.Ct. at 2319.
98. Id. (quoting Wilkinson, 544 U.S. at 78).
99. Id. (quoting Wilkinson, 544 U.S. at 82).
100. Howard Wasserman, Osborne and Due Process, PRAWFSBLAWG (June 30,
2009, 6:54 AM), http://prawfsblawg.blogs.com/prawfsblawg/2009/06/osborne-and-dueprocess.html.

101. Id.
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a variety of due process grounds, both procedural and substantive, to
support a constitutional claim for post-conviction access to DNA
testing.
A.

History and Function of the Due Process Clause

The Fifth Amendment was adopted in 1791. It prohibits the federal
government from depriving any person of life, liberty, or property
without due process of law.1 02 The Fourteenth Amendment was added to the Bill of Rights in 1868. It provides that "no State
shall. . .deprive any person of life, liberty, or property without due
process of law."1 0 3 It protects individuals from abridgement of rights
from state governments as well as the federal government. Otherwise,
the two clauses have been interpreted identically. As a limitation on
Congress, the Supreme Court has held that the Due Process Clause
provides two functions: (1) a remedial function when other constitutional rights have been violated; and (2) to impose restrictions on both
legal procedures as well as on legal substance.10 4 In this way, it acts as
a limitation on the state's right to restrict certain substantive rights of
its citizens, and as a limitation on congressional power. It does not
affect the state's rights to legislate the issues affecting the substantive
right at issue; it simply bars the state's denial of the right. In Osborne,
the court addressed a petitioner's claim to access DNA post-conviction as both a procedural due process right and a substantive due process right.
B.

ProceduralDue Process Right

There are three main constitutional grounds rooted in a prisoner's
procedural due process right that proponents argued could support
Osborne's claim for DNA testing: (1) actual innocence, (2) a residual
liberty interest, and (3) an extension of the Brady doctrine.
1. Claims of Actual Innocence
Claims of actual innocence are based on the "factual innocence" of
the petitioner. They are often brought when additional evidence tending to show the petitioner is actually innocent is discovered following
conviction. They must be brought in habeas because success in the
action would mean that the petitioner was in fact, innocent of the underlying crime; and therefore "necessarily imply" the invalidity of the
The Court's jurisprudence has divided claims of actual
conviction.'
102. Veronica C. Abreu, Note, The Malleable Use of History in Substantive Due
Process Jurisprudence: How the "Deeply Rooted" Test Should Not Be a Barrier to
Finding the Defense of Marriage Act Unconstitutional Under the Fifth Amendment's
Due Process Clause, 44 B.C. L. REV. 177, 181 (2002) (citing U.S. Const. amend. V).
103. U.S. CONST. AMEND. XIV.
104. Id. at 181-82.
105. Heck, 512 U.S. 477.
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innocence into two categories: (1) substantive innocence claims and
(2) procedural innocence claims. 1 0 6
a.

Substantive Innocence Claims

In Herrera v. Collins, the Supreme Court made it clear that claims
of actual innocence are not themselves constitutional claims justifying
federal habeas relief when the petitioner was afforded an "entirely
fair and error free" trial. 07 Nonetheless, the Court did acknowledge
that a "truly persuasive" post-trial demonstration of actual innocence
may render a defendant's execution unconstitutional and give him a
freestanding innocence claim in federal habeas court. 108 The Court
suggested that such a claim would only be available in capital cases,
and only if the state does not provide an effective avenue for relief.
The Court declined to define what threshold showing would have to
be made in order to trigger relief other than to say that it would necessarily be "extraordinarily high.""0 ' This was for two reasons: (1) the
disruptive effect that allowing such claims would have on the state's
interest in finality, and (2) the notion that once a defendant has been
afforded a fair trial and convicted, the presumption of innocence disappears."o This presupposes that only the execution of an innocent
person is so "constitutionally intolerable" as to overcome the Court's
interest in finality and comity.
b.

ProceduralInnocence Claims

In Schlup v. Delo, the court carved out an exception, whereby a
constitutional claim based on procedural error during the underlying
criminal proceedings may be heard on the merits if it is accompanied
by a threshold showing of actual innocence.11 1 Herrera claims are
constitutional claims in and of themselves. Schlup claims of actual innocence are not themselves constitutional claims, but rather a "gateway through which a petitioner must pass to have his otherwise barred
constitutional claim considered. "112
The exception is grounded in the principle that redress is available
to ensure that individuals are not imprisoned in violation of the Constitution, rather than to address errors of fact." 3 A Schlup claim must
be accompanied by a claim of constitutional error at trial." 4 Absent a
106. See also Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 314 (1995) (contrasting petitioner
Schulp's procedural claim of innocence with Herrera's substantive claim of innocence
in Herrera v. Collins).
107. Herrera, 506 U.S. at 400.
108. Id. at 417.
109. Id.
110. Id. at 399, 417.
111. Schlup, 513 U.S. 298.
112. Id. at 315.
113. Herrera,506 U.S. at 400.
114. Schlup, 513 U.S. at 316.
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showing that the petitioner received an unfair trial, the exception is
not available. The Court wanted to ensure that the exception would
only be available in "extraordinary cases," so it also tied the exception
to the petitioner's innocence. 15 It reasoned that reliable evidence capable of showing actual innocence, such as "exculpatory scientific evidence, trustworthy eyewitness accounts, or critical physical evidence
unavailable at trial," would be unavailable in the majority of cases.' 16
Obviously, the reliability of modern DNA evidence has altered this
analysis.
In 2006, the Supreme Court agreed to hear a petitioner's post conviction appeal based on DNA testing for the first time. In House v.
Bell, a petitioner presented post-conviction DNA evidence that established that the semen found on the victim's nightgown came from her
husband, and not from the petitioner. This directly contradicted evidence presented at trial. He obtained access to testing through Tennessee's relevant statute. The Court held that the petitioner met the
threshold of a Schlup "procedural innocence" claim by casting sufficient doubt on his guilt."' Again, the Court cursorily acknowledged
the hypothetical freestanding innocence claim set forth in Herrerabut
"[declined] to resolve the issue," only acknowledging that "whatever
burden" a freestanding innocence claim would require, "this petitioner has not satisfied it.""' 8
c.

Due Process Claim for Access to DNA Grounded in
Actual Innocence

It is important that a distinction be made between claims of actual
innocence and claims for access to the DNA used to bring an actual
innocence claim. Claims of actual innocence are only relevant to the
extent that a prisoner is provided meaningful access to the means necessary to prove his innocence. Osborne was seeking access to DNA
testing; he did not yet know if the evidence sought could be used to
support an actual innocence claim or not. Even assuming that DNA
testing conclusively proving innocence would meet the "extraordinarily high" threshold set forth for freestanding actual innocence claims
under Herrera,Osborne must first obtain the right to access the test.
Absent access, Osborne does not have a viable actual innocence
claim.
This concept has led to the argument that due process demands a
prisoner be guaranteed access to DNA evidence:119 "a right of access
to DNA evidence may be the procedure that is necessary for a peti115. Id. at 324.
116.
117.
118.
119.

Id. at 324.
House v. Bell, 547 U.S. 518, 555 (2006).
Id.
Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S. 293, 317 (1963).
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tioner to establish a well supported claim of actual innocence. "120 The
problem arises when state post-conviction statutes are inadequate to
provide access to DNA testing. In that case, the only way to ensure
access is through the recognition of a constitutionally protected procedural due process right to obtain the evidence; however, this would
mean the Court must acknowledge that state procedures are
inadequate.
2.

Due Process Protection of a Prisoner's Residual Post-Conviction
Liberty Interest

A constitutional post-conviction right of access to DNA may also
stem from a prisoner's residual post-conviction liberty interest.121 Supreme Court precedent makes it clear that a lawful conviction "does
not entirely eliminate the liberty interests of convicted persons." 2 2
Although the exact contours of this liberty interest are unclear, it is
likely that some portion of "a prisoner's interest in freedom from bodily restraint" survives criminal conviction and incarceration.12 3 For
example, even if a prisoner is barred from pursuing his claim any further because of procedural hurdles, he still has a right to pursue his
freedom through clemency; 1 2 4 however, in order to pursue clemency,
a prisoner must be able to access the evidence needed to present it to
the executive.125 This suggests that access to DNA testing may be the
due process necessary to safeguard a convict's interest in clemency or
some other liberty interests.
3.

An Extension of Brady Access to Exculpatory Evidence

Some people have argued that a prisoner's residual liberty interest
is such that due process necessitates an extension of the pre-trial constitutional right of access to exculpatory evidence.12 6 The Supreme
Court first recognized a defendant's right of access to exculpatory evidence held by the prosecution as a matter of fairness in Brady v. Maryland.127 The Court held that the suppression of evidence favorable
to the accused violates due process.12 8 In Pennsylvania v. Ritchie,
Brady was extended to potentially exculpatory evidence as well so
120. Elizabeth A. Laughton, McKithen v. Brown: Due Process and Post-Conviction
DNA Testing, 2008 DUKE L. & TECH. REV. 7, 14 (2008).
121. Id. at 19.
122. Osborne, 129 S.Ct. at 2334 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
123. Harvey II, 285 F.3d at 312 (Luttig, J., respecting the denial of the rehearing en
banc).
124. Herrera, 506 U.S. at 410-11.
125. Laughton, supra note 4, at 11.
126. Id., at 10.
127. Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963).
128. Id. at 87.
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that the court could review it and determine its import;' 2 9 however,
Brady was still only recognized as a pre-trial right.13 0
Leading up to Osborne, arguments were made that Brady should be
extended to encompass post-conviction access to exculpatory evidence, particularly DNA testing.131 The argument was that the same
underlying notion of basic fairness that governs pre-trial production of
all potentially exculpatory evidence governs post-trial production of
evidence held by the government since testing could prove beyond
any doubt that the defendant did not commit the crime for which he

was convicted. 13 2

4. Osborne invalidated each of the foregoing procedural due
process grounds for bringing a claim for access to DNA testing.
The Supreme Court analyzed each of the above grounds for recognizing a constitutional right to access DNA testing. For various reasons, the Court held that the right was not supported by any of these
bases. The Court combined its analysis of Osborne's arguments that
access to DNA testing is the due process necessary to protect both his
right to bring an actual innocence claim and his residual liberty interest. It found that a constitutional due process claim is not necessary to
safeguard either interest so long as the State provides adequate procedure.1 33 According to the Court, the "question is whether consideration of Osborne's claim within the framework of the State's
procedures for post-conviction relief" offends some principle of justice so rooted in the traditions and conscience of our people as to be
ranked as fundamental."' 3 4 Osborne recognized that Osborne did
have some part of a residual liberty interest to prove his innocence. 135
Under state law, he had a "liberty interest in demonstrating his innocence with new evidence." The court recognized Alaska's post-conviction statute as the mechanism to safeguard this interest.13 6 The Court
claimed that there is "nothing inadequate about the procedures
Alaska has provided to vindicate its state right to post-conviction relief in general, and nothing inadequate about how those procedures
apply to those who seek access to DNA evidence." 13 7 It based its determination on Alaska's providing a "right to be released on a sufficiently compelling showing of new evidence that establishes
129. Pennsylvania v. Ritchie, 480 U.S. 39 (1987).
130. See id. at 52-53 (holding that the Confrontation Clause protects a defendant's
trial rights but does not compel pretrial disclosure of information which may help the
defense prepare the case); Laughton, supra note 4, at 9.
131. Id. at to.
132. Harvey II, 285 F.3d at 317.
133. Osborne, 129 S.Ct. at 2320.
134. Id.
135. Osborne, 129 S.Ct. at 2319.
136. Id.
137. Id. at 2320.
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innocence" and the state's declaration that the statute's discovery procedures are applicable to convicts seeking access to post-conviction
DNA testing.'3 8 The court acknowledged that there are limitations on
what is discoverable under the statute: "The evidence must be newly
available . . . , must have been diligently pursued, and must also be

sufficiently material;" however, it maintained that Alaska's statute is
not inconsistent with the "traditions and conscience of our people." 13 9
Osborne definitively holds that Brady does not extend to the postconviction context. Because Osborne was convicted in a fair trial, his
"right to due process is not parallel to a trial right [and] he has only a
limited interest in post-conviction relief."14 0 In some circumstances, a
state-created right can beget other rights essential to their realization;
however, the Court held that it would go too far to conclude that due
process requires Brady be extended to Osborne's post-conviction lib-

erty interest.141
In his concurrence, Justice Alito disagrees with the majority that
Brady should not be extended to the post-conviction context. He
frames the right to access DNA testing post-conviction as a classic
Brady claim, which must therefore be brought in habeas; 142 however,
Alito confused the doctrine's application. Typical Brady material is
evidence that exculpates on its face, such as the results of DNA testing
suggesting the prisoner did not commit the crime. 143 By definition, the
failure to turn over exculpatory evidence necessarily implies the invalidity of the conviction and must be brought in habeas. Osborne did
not know if the evidence he was seeking was exculpatory or not; that
depended on the outcome of the testing which he was seeking to perform. For this reason, the majority was correct that a constitutional
right of access to DNA testing sued for under § 1983 cannot be
couched as an extension of a Brady claim.
VIII.

POST-OSBORNE: WHAT Is LEFT FOR PRISONERS SEEKING TO
EVIDENCE To PROVE THEIR INNOCENCE
PoST-CONvicTiON

ACCESs DNA

The Osborne opinion was couched as a states-right opinion. The
Court concluded that Osborne did not have a constitutional claim to
post-conviction access to DNA testing because he had not exhausted
the remedies provided to him by the State of Alaska. The Court held
that Osborne was afforded adequate due process by the state; however, the fact remains that he was denied access to evidence that could
conclusively prove his guilt or innocence. Thus, the state court's ap138.
139.
140.
141.
142.
143.

Id.
Id. at 2320-21.
Osborne, 129 S.Ct. at 2320.
Id. at 2319-20.
Osborne, 129 S.Ct. at 2325 (Alito, J., concurring).
See Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87-89 (1963).
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plication of the statute begs serious questions about "whether the
State's proceedings are fundamentally unfair in their operation."' 4 4
Even if Osborne had pursued his claims through state court, it is unlikely that he would have received relief because Alaska's statute does
not apply to DNA testing that was available at the time of trial and
STR DNA testing was available at that time-it was not utilized based
on trial strategy.14 5 Furthermore, the state concedes that no litigant
has ever obtained access to DNA testing under the Statute.14 6 By
holding that Alaska's application of its post-conviction relief statute
did not violate Osborne's due process, the Court averred that it is not
willing to interfere with the state's right to legislate in this area: "to
suddenly constitutionalize this area would short-circuit what looks to
be a prompt and considered legislative response."147
Osborne demonstrates that not all state statutes provide relief. The
only way to ensure that all citizens are able to utilize DNA technology
to determine guilt or innocence is by the recognition of a constitutional right. Since the Osborne Court invalidates all procedural due
process grounds for bringing a claim, courts must recognize a substantive due process right.
The Osborne Court did address whether a substantive due process
right existed and held that it did not; however, the Court's substantive
due process jurisprudence belies a willingness to revisit the right based
on public opinions and moral consensus. Furthermore, the recognition of a substantive due process right is consistent with the Court's
efforts to retain state rights because the recognition of a substantive
due process right would not prohibit the states from legislating the
particular details of post-conviction access to DNA testing; rather, it
would simply bar the state's denial of that right.
A.

The History of the Substantive Due Process Doctrine

Due process rights are not limited to the specific guarantees enumerated in the Constitution.1 4 8 Substantive due process made its first
appearance in the Court's jurisprudence in Lochner v. New York
where it invoked the Due Process Clause to strike down a New York
statute limiting the number of hours bakers could work a week.149 The
Court reasoned that the statute interfered with an individual's right
and liberty to contract.' 50 The Court held that the freedom to contract was implicit in the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment. Thus, it significantly expanded the scope of the Due
144.
145.
146.
147.
148.
149.
150.

Osborne, 129 S. Ct. at 2332 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
Id. at 2333.
Osborne, 129 S.Ct at 2333 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
Id. at 2322.
Abreu, supra note 102, at 181
Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
Id. at 61.
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Process Clause to protect substantive rights.1 5 ' For several decades
following, the Court frequently used the doctrine to strike down laws
that it found incompatible with a particular social or economic

philosophy.152
For example, in Pierce v. Society of Sisters, the Court used substantive due process to strike down a state law requiring school children to
attend public schools because the right to educate a child in the school
of the parent's choice-public or private-is protected by the Due
Process Clause. 5 1 Similarly, in Meyer v. State of Nebraska, the Court
held that a law making it illegal to teach school children foreign languages before high school was unconstitutional. 154
The Ninth Amendment of the Constitution lent additional support
to the substantive due process doctrine.' 5 The Ninth Amendment ensures that "the enumeration in the Constitution of certain rights, shall
not be construed to deny or disparage others retained by the people."' 5 6 The amendment was introduced to quiet expressed fears that
a bill of specifically enumerated rights could not be broad enough to
cover all essential rights.'
The Ninth Amendment also illustrates the
The framframers' intent for the Constitution to retain flexibility.'
ers intentionally left the concept of liberty open to gather meaning
from experience: "[The] constitution [was] intended to endure for
ages to come, and, consequently, to be adapted to the various crises of
human affairs."' 5 9
B.

Criticism of Substantive Due Process and Its Demise

The Lochner era, characterized by the Court's readiness to recognize rights not specifically enumerated in the Constitution, was widely
criticized.' 6 0 The central criticism was that "unelected judges were unduly substituting their own values for those of popularly elected legislatures." 6 ' Critics also worried that judges were overstepping their
boundaries by reading a substantive component into the Due Process
Clause in addition to its procedural restrictions.' 6 2 Because the sub151. Id. at 53.
152. John C. Toro, The Charade of Tradition-Based Substantive Due Process,
N.Y.U. J. L. & LIB., 172, 176 (2009).
153. Pierce v. Soc'y of the Sisters of the Holy Names of Jesus and Mary, 268 U.S.
510, 534-35 (1925).
154. Meyer v. Neb., 262 U.S. 390, 403 (1923).
155. See Griswold v. Conn., 381 U.S. 479, 488-89 (1965) (Goldberg, J., concurring).
156. U.S. CONST. amend. IX
157. Griswold, 381 U.S. at 488-89 (Goldberg, J., concurring).
158. See id.; Abreu, supra note 102, at 193.
159. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316, 415 (1819).
160. Toro, supra note 152, at 175.
161. Id. (citing ERWIN CHEMERISNSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND
POLICIES 616 (3d ed. 2006)).
162. See id. at 174 ("Justice Black argued that protecting substantive rights under
the Due Process Clause encroaches on the legislative province because it 'require[s]
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stantive element is not explicitly addressed in the Constitution, critics
argued that substantive due process was nothing more than judicial
interpretation. 163
As a result, the Court made attempts to move away from previous
opinions which held laws unconstitutional for a violation of freedom
of contract. 1 64 Instead, it averred that "regulation which is reasonable
in relation to its subject and is adopted in the interests of the community is due process." 65 The Court made it clear that it would be more
deferential to legislative judgment in the future.16 6 In 1963, the Court
gave assurances that it had moved away from the judicial activism that
dominated the Lochner era and that it would not exceed its proper
role as a neutral interpreter of the law again: although "there was a
time when the Due Process Clause was used by this Court to strike
down laws which were thought unreasonable, that is, unwise or incompatible with some particular economic or social philosophy," that doctrine "has long since been discarded." 1 6 7
C.

The Re-Emergence of Substantive Due Process

Substantive due process was not invoked again until 1965 when the
6
There, the Court struck
Court decided Griswold v. Connecticut.'1
down a Connecticut state statute banning contraceptives on the
ground that it violated the right to marital privacy-a right not enumerated in the Constitution.1 6 9 The majority opinion was careful not
to frame its decision as one based on the Due Process Clause. It attempted to distance itself from the Lochner era; it spoke of "penumbras," formed by emanations from specific guarantees in the Bill of
Rights "that help give [those guarantees] life and substance." The
Court continued to expand the list of substantive rights protected by
the Constitution although it couched them as rights emanating from
the Bill of Rights rather than the Due Process Clause.170 Griswold
also marked the beginning of the modern substantive due process era,
in which the Court applies the doctrine predominantly to social issues
as opposed to the economic liberties of the Lochner era.17 1
judges to determine what is or is not constitutional on the basis of their own appraisal
of what laws are unwise or unnecessary'").
163. See id.
164. See id. at 175 (reporting that the Court upheld a minimum wage requirement
in West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parish and thereby overruled previous opinions which held
similar statutes unconstitutional under the Due Process Clause).
165. Id.
166. Id.
167. Id. at 175-76.

168. See id. at 176; Griswold v. Conn., 381 U.S. 479, 485 (1965).
169. Id.

170. See id.
171. See Griswold, 381 U.S. 479; Toro, supra note 152, at 177.
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The Court Uses the "Deeply Rooted" Test to Find
Substantive Rights

Despite attempts in Griswold to avoid the perception that the Court
was interpreting the Due Process Clause to protect substantive rights,
it candidly acknowledged in Loving v. Virginia that the freedom to
marry is derived from the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment.172 Again, in Roe v. Wade, the Court recognized that the
right to privacy is founded in the Fourteenth Amendment's concept of
personal liberty and restrictions upon state action;17 3 however, the
concern that judges were reading their own values into the Due Process clause by enacting policy in place of the state legislatures remained. 1 7 4 Four years later, Justice White voiced his concern "that the
Court has no license to invalidate legislation which it thinks merely
arbitrary or unreasonable.""
The Court has dealt with this apprehension by only protecting substantive rights under the Due Process clause that are deemed fundamental. 1 7 6 To determine what rights are fundamental, the Court has
adopted two tests: (1) the "deeply rooted" test which protects un-enumerated rights only if they are "objectively, deeply rooted in this Nation's history and tradition;"' 7 and (2) the "ordered liberty" test
which would strike down laws that infringe on rights that are "implicit
in the concept of ordered liberty." 78 The Court has expressed a preference for the "deeply rooted" test in accomplishing the stated purpose of preventing judges from inserting their personal partialities
into the Constitution:' 79 this "approach tends to rein in the subjective
elements that are necessarily present in due process judicial reFor that reason, most courts have adopted the "deeply
view."'
rooted" test; however, this Note argues that the adherence to the
"deeply rooted" test as set forth in Washington has continued in name
only. The test is so easily manipulated that Courts are able to contour
the test to achieve their desired results.

172. Loving v. Va., 388 U.S. 1,12 (1967); See Abreu, supra note 102, at 187.
173. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973)
174. See Toro, supra note 152, at 179.
175. Id.; Moore v. City of E. Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 543 (White, J., dissenting).
176. Abreu, supra note 102, at 181.
177. Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 194 (1986) overruled by Lawrence v. Texas,
539 U.S. 558 (2003) (overruled on other grounds); see also Washington v. Glucksberg,
521 U.S. 702, 720-21 (1997) (citing Moore, 431 U.S. at 503 (plurality opinion)).
178. Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937).
179. Washington, 521 U.S. at 721.
180. Id. at 722.
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The Court's Analysis of Osborne's Claim Under the
"Deeply Rooted" Test

In addition to various procedural due process claims, Osborne
brought a substantive due process claim for access to DNA testing.','
18 2
The Osborne court used the "deeply rooted" test to strike it down.
At first glance, this test seems instantly and fundamentally to bar Osborne's claim since DNA testing is a new technology which by defini83
tion, cannot be deeply rooted in the Nation's history and tradition.'
The Court avers that Osborne does not have a right to access state
evidence to apply DNA testing technology based solely on the reasoning that there is no history of a right to DNA testing: "the mere novelty of such a claim is reason enough to doubt that substantive due
process sustains it."1 84
In his dissent, Justice Souter addresses the obvious flaws in the majority's cursory analysis: "There is no denying that the Court is correct
when it notes that a claim of right to DNA testing, post-trial at that, is
a novel one, but that only reflects the relative novelty of testing DNA,
... and is not a sufficient reason alone to reject the right."' 8 5 The rest
of his opinion is framed as an argument that recognition of a substantive due process right to access DNA should be analyzed under the
"ordered liberty" test rather than the "deeply rooted" test.1 86 According to Souter, the substantive due process doctrine is an expression of the notion that the liberty it protects is free from arbitrary
governmental action." However, he recognizes that technological
advances can alter societal views on the reasonableness of certain
governmental actions. What would have at one time seemed a proper
governmental restriction may in time, be deemed overly restrictive of
one's liberty."' 8
Souter emphasizes that this change often happens slowly and the
Court cannot be blamed for refusing to endorse a new moral claim
Instead, just as individual experience affects the caimmediately.'
pacity of that individual to see the potential legitimacy of a moral position, the broader society needs the chance to take part in the
"political back and forth" about a new liberty claim before the Court
can legitimately declare state or national laws arbitrary to the point of
being unconstitutional.' 90 Therefore, under Souter's analysis it is not
only possible, but likely that the Court will revisit this claim; and
181.
182.
183.
184.
185.
186.
187.
188.
189.
190.

Osborne, 129 S.Ct. at 2322.
Id. at 2320.
Id. at 2322.
Id.
Id. at 2340 (Souter, J., dissenting).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 2341.
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based on changes in societal perceptions on the liberty implications of
denying prisoners' access to DNA testing to prove their innocence,
recognize it as a fundamental right.
F. Why the Claim to Post-Conviction Access to DNA Will
Be Revisited
Osborne's declaration that this right does not pass the "deeply
rooted" test will not bar the Court from reconsidering the claim. The
Court has frequently revisited substantive due process claims and declared rights fundamental which it previously refused to recognize
under "deeply rooted" test. Because there is no objective yardstick by
which to determine how a tradition should be described, the Court
retains a vast degree of discretion in deciding how narrowly or broadly
to define the tradition at issue in a particular case."' If the Court
aims to find a particular right fundamental, it analyzes the history of a
broader, more generalized right in applying the test.' 9 2 The Court
does this when the right at issue would not be deeply rooted in our
history and traditions, if it was defined narrowly.' 9 3 By defining the
right broadly, it can hinge its analysis on the broader right's deep roots
and hold the narrower right, which is actually at issue, to be fundamental.' 94 Therefore, by defining the right in a broader, more generalized manner, the Court is able to fit a more expansive set of rights
into the "deeply rooted" test, and therefore afford them fundamental
status. 195
Most often, the Court alters its definition of the right at issue in
order to remain consistent with the moral progress of the public and
to pull along straggling states. Thus, the doctrine has been used by the
Court as a reaction to public opinion and to set a moral bar under
which states are not allowed to drop. Yet, it has often taken the Court
time to recognize the relevant rights, as it waits for public opinion to
cement.1 9 6 By altering its definition of the right at hand, the Court is
able to reach an outcome consistent with changes in society's moral
perception of an individual's liberty interest in the corresponding
right.' 97
Whether a right is defined narrowly or broadly often has a profound
impact on the outcome of the case.' 9 For example, in the 1965 deci191. Toro, supra note 152, at 186.
192. See id. at 187 (arguing that judges can more readily strike down statutes they
deem contrary to a broad definition of tradition).
193. Abreu, supra note 102, at 199-200.
194. Id.
195. Id.
196. See Toro, supra note 152, at 186.
197. See id. (arguing that the Court can selectively emphasize supportive history or
temper unsupportive history to alter which unenumerated rights are constitutionally
protected).
198. Id.

Published by Texas A&M Law Scholarship, 2022

23

Texas Wesleyan Law Review, Vol. 17 [2022], Iss. 4, Art. 7

588

TEXAS WESLEYAN LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 17

sion Griswold v. Connecticut, the Court struck down a Connecticut
statute that imposed a fine or imprisonment on anyone who used contraceptive drugs or devices to prevent conception.'" It based its holding on a broad right to privacy in one's personal relationships,
particularly marriage rather than on the narrow right to use contraception. 200 Because the Court defined the right to privacy within marital relations as fundamental, it was also able to define the narrower
right to use contraception within those relationships as fundamental
and deeply rooted in our society.
It is incontrovertible that the Court's holding was at least, in part,
based on society's changing moral perception of contraceptive use.
The birth control pill was made publicly available in the United States
only five years prior, in 1960; and the sexual revolution beginning in
the 1960s signaled a shift in how society viewed sexuality.20 1 Sexual
liberalization brought with it a more general societal acceptance of
contraceptive use.20 2 The Supreme Court's decision aligned with the
moral consensus of the country.
Similarly, in 1967, the Court held in Loving v. Virginia that a Virginia anti-miscegenation statute violated an individual's due process
interest in the freedom to marry the person of their choosing. 203
Again, the holding was based on the broad notion that "marriage is
one of the basic civil rights of man, fundamental to our very existence
and survival." 204 Thus, the Court was able to strike down the statute
by framing it in the larger context of the fundamental right to marry
despite the fact that the particular non-traditional form of marriage at
issue was not "deeply rooted" in the nation's history. By 1967, Virginia was one of only sixteen states that still prohibited interracial
marriages; and in the fifteen years prior, fourteen states had repealed
laws outlawing interracial marriages.2 05 This suggests that the Court
was willing to protect the right to marry interracially only after the
majority of the country demonstrated a moral acceptance of interracial marriages.
The Court's readiness to manipulate the "deeply rooted" test to effectuate an outcome consistent with the moral consensus of the country is perhaps best illustrated through its jurisprudence on homosexual
sodomy. As recently as 1986, in Bowers v. Hardwick, the Court held
that a Georgia statute proscribing homosexual sodomy did not violate
199. Griswold v. Conn., 381 U.S. 479, 485 (1965).
200. Id. at 484-85.
201. Claudia Goldin & Lawrence F. Katz, The Power of the Pill: Oral Contraceptives and Women's Career and Marriage Decisions, 110 J. Pol. Econ 730, 730-34
(2002), http://www.economics.harvard.edu/faculty/katz/ files/goldin katz-pill.pdf.
202. Id. at 732.
203. Loving v. Va., 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967).
204. Id. at 12.
205. Id. at 6 & n.5.
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the fundamental rights of homosexuals. 206 It framed its analysis narrowly by focusing on the nation's specific tradition against homosexual sodomy: "proscriptions against that conduct have ancient
roots." 207 In his concurrence, Justice Burger wrote that "condemnation of those practices is firmly rooted in Judeo-Christian moral and
ethical standards." 2 08 The Court emphasized the fact that twentyfour states and the District of Columbia continue to provide criminal
penalties for sodomy. 2 0 9 In refusing to define a new fundamental
right, it reiterated its familiar argument that the Court should not
overstep its boundaries by second-guessing the legislature.2 10
Not surprisingly, this argument was absent in 2003 when the Court
declared a similar Texas statute unconstitutional as violating an individual's fundamental right to "engage in certain intimate conduct." 2 1 1
In Lawrence v. Texas, the Court found it necessary to revisit Bowers
in light of a broader commitment to individual privacy and personal
autonomy: "Adults may choose to enter upon this relationship in the
confines of. . .their own private lives and still retain their dignity as
free persons." 2 1 2 The Court chose to frame the right in broad terms
by speaking of a commitment to freedom and equality, rather than
narrowly focusing on the specific right at issue: homosexual sodomy. 2 1 3 Thus, it was able to invalidate the law under the "deeply
rooted" test.
Again, this illustrates the Court's propensity to constitutionalize
due process protections only after similar sub-constitutional protections have been widely established. In the time between Bowers and
Lawrence were decided, states with laws prohibiting the relevant conduct were reduced to thirteen, of which only four enforce their laws
against homosexual conduct.2 14 Moreover, the moral perception of
homosexuality changed drastically in those years. By 2003, homosexuality was far more widely accepted in mainstream America.

206.
207.
208.
209.
210.
211.
212.
213.
214.

Bowers, 478 U.S. 186.
Id. at 192.
Id. at 196 (Burger, J., concurring).
Id. at 193.
See id.
Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 567 (2003).
Id.
See id.
Id. at 573.
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CONCLUSION: THE NATION'S READINESS TO EMBRACE POST-

CONVICTION ACCESS TO
SUBSTANTIVE

DNA

AS A FUNDAMENTAL

RIGHT MAKES

DUE PROCESS THE MOST LIKELY MEANS OF

RECOGNIZING A CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT AND BRINGING
THE STATES IN LINE

The Court's history of revisiting issues and retroactively recognizing
a substantive due process right makes it the most likely means of ultimately recognizing a constitutional right to access DNA testing postconviction. Furthermore, its inclination towards applying the "deeply
rooted" test flexibly according to the specific rights at stake will allow
it to revisit the concept of constitutionalizing post-conviction access to
DNA and ultimately reach a different conclusion. In Osborne, the
Court defines the right to post-conviction access to DNA narrowly,
and therefore finds no basis in history or tradition for the right.2 15
This is only because of the relative newness of this technology: "of
course courts have not historically granted convicted persons access to
physical evidence for STR testing."2 16 By framing the right broadly as
a right to physical liberty and freedom from arbitrary government action, rather than as a narrow right to DNA testing, the right to postconviction access to DNA will be compatible with the "deeply rooted"
test. Under Supreme Court precedent, the "most elemental" of the
liberties protected by the Due Process Clause is the "interest in being
free from physical detention by one's own government. 21 7 Thus, when
one considers an innocent prisoner, petitioning for the right to access
DNA evidence to prove his innocence, it unquestionably becomes a
violation of his fundamental rights to deny him such access. It is necessary to frame the analysis in this way since it is ultimately the innocent prisoner which the system is trying to vindicate.
Today, there is evidence of national recognition that the court system does not always produce the right result and an ensuing interest
in prisoners' post-conviction rights. Forty-seven states provide some
form of post-conviction access to DNA testing. 218 The impact of
groups, such as the National Innocence Project, which campaigns for
prisoner rights, 2 19 is felt nationwide. It has helped to exonerate 254
inmates across the country. 220 The Innocence Network is a group of
law schools, journalism schools and public defender offices across the
215. See Osborne, 129 S.Ct. at 2320-23.
216. Id. at 2338 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
217. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 529 (2004) (citing Foucha v. Louisiana, 504
U.S. 71, 80 (1992)).
218. Access to Post-Conviction DNA Testing, THE INNOCENCE PROJECT, http://
www.innocenceproject.org/Content/304.php (last visited Feb 13, 2011).
219. About the Innocence Project, THE INNOCENCE PROJECT, http://www.
innocenceproject.org/about (last visited Feb 13, 2011).
220. Innocence Project Case Profiles, THE INNOCENCE PROJECT, http://www.
innocenceproject.org/know (last visited Feb 13, 2011).
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country that assists inmates in accessing DNA testing to prove their
innocence.2 2 1
The Court has consistently recognized fundamental rights in accordance with the evolving societal conscience. They do this to pull retrograde states along and impose some national floor of rights where it
is clear that protection of the right is generally consistent with society's moral conscience. As awareness grows and more convicts are
exonerated with DNA evidence, the moral pulse of the country will
continue to shift towards the view that prisoners should be given the
opportunity to access DNA testing in cases where it is likely to prove
their guilt or innocence. The Court will respond by using substantive
due process as a tool to implement a base level of rights to which all
prisoners should be entitled based on the broad concepts of liberty
and justice. States like Alaska, which do not have a post-conviction
access statute, or which make it procedurally difficult for prisoners to
obtain actual access will be forced to provide at least a base level of
rights.
Despite the Court's dismissal of a substantive due process claim in
Osborne, the Court's substantive due process jurisprudence suggests
that the Court will likely revisit the issue in the future and ultimately
recognize the right to post-conviction DNA testing. There is an increasing moral consensus in the country that prisoners should be given
access to potentially exculpatory evidence. Because state statutory
remedies are inconsistent and incomplete, the Court must lead the
way in dictating proper policy regarding access to DNA testing by recognizing a substantive due process right. Doing so would not affect
the state's rights to legislate the issues affecting that right, as the Court
suggests; rather, it would simply bar the state's denial of the right.
221. About the Innocence Project, THE INNOCENCE
innocenceproject.org/about (last visited Feb 13, 2011).
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